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ABSTRACT
Data privacy protection is an important research area, which
is especially critical in this big data era. To a large extent,
the privacy of visual classification tasks is mainly in the one-
to-one mapping between image and its corresponding label,
since this relation provides a great amount of information and
can be used in other scenarios. In this paper, we propose map-
ping distortion protection (MDP) and its augmentation-based
extension (AugMDP) to protect the data privacy by modify-
ing the original dataset. In MDP, the label of the modified im-
age does not match the ground-truth mapping, yet DNNs can
still learn the ground-truth relation even when the provided
mapping is distorted. As such, this method protects privacy
when the dataset is leaked. Extensive experiments are con-
ducted on CIFAR-10 and restricted CASIA-WebFace dataset,
which verifies the effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed
method.
Index Terms— Privacy protection, Face recognition, Im-
age classification, Deep learning
1. INTRODUCTION
Deep Learning, especially deep neural networks (DNNs),
have been widely and successfully used in many fields, such
as visual classification [1, 2, 3], object detection [4, 5, 6, 7],
super-resolution [8, 9, 10], and visual tracking [11, 12, 13].
A large amount of training data is one of the key factors in
the success of deep learning methods. Some of the well-
developed methods, such as face recognition, have been used
in real life.
While the massive amount of data dramatically improves
the performance of the deep learning-based model, the collec-
tion of data from millions of users also raises serious privacy
issues. For example, companies always store the training data
on their servers, which may contain some sensitive items such
as facial images used to log in to a specific system. However,
this information has the risk of leakage, which harms the pri-
vacy of users.
To a large extent, the privacy of visual classification tasks
is mainly in the ground-truth one-to-one mapping between
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the input image and its corresponding label, since this re-
lation provides a significant amount of information and can
be used in other scenarios. One of the most interesting re-
lated works, the k-anonymity [14], concentrates on hiding the
ground-truth one-to-one mapping between the field-structure
data and its corresponding label. Specifically, k-anonymity
hides the mapping by guaranteeing that individuals who are
the subjects of the data can not be re-identified while the pri-
vate data remains practically available. However, this method
mainly focuses on field-structured data, which can not be used
in protecting images.
In this paper, we propose mapping distortion protection
(MDP) and its augmentation-based extension (AugMDP).
Our approaches aim at exploring a new possible way to pro-
tect the visual privacy in classification tasks by distorting the
ground-truth one-to-one mapping between the image and its
label. In other words, for a specific image in the modified
dataset, its provided label does not match what the image
looks like. For example, in the modified dataset, which con-
tains only distorted mapping, a dog-like image may be labeled
as the car. In this way, we can still protect the privacy when
the dataset is leaked, under the condition that the hacker has
no prior knowledge of the ground-truth mapping. Besides,
models that use the modified dataset for training can still
achieve good generalization on the standard test set, which
guarantees the utility of the private dataset.
The mechanism behind MDP is that DNNs utilize lots of
unstable yet useful features such as texture, as discussed in
[15, 16]. It is precisely by hiding the information of the target
image in the modified image that DNNs can learn the ground-
truth relation even when the provided mapping is distorted.
As such, companies can protect visual privacy by only storing
the modified dataset instead of the original one with sensitive
ground-truth mapping on their servers.
In addition to protecting data privacy, MDP has two extra
latent advantages as follows: 1) The hackers may be insensi-
ble of the correctness of the dataset, and it is hard to denoise
the modified dataset without prior knowledge even if they are
aware of the distorted mapping. 2) The leak can be detected if
someone applies the distorted mapping provided in the modi-
fied dataset.
The main contributions of our work can be summarized
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as follows: 1) We propose a novel privacy protection method,
dubbed mapping distortion protection (MDP), by modifying
the ground-truth relation between image and the correspond-
ing label. 2) An augmentation-based extension (AugMDP) is
proposed, which further enhances the performance. 3) Exten-
sive experiments are conducted, which verifies the feasibility
and effectiveness of the proposed method.
2. PROPOSED METHOD
2.1. Preliminary
Suppose D = {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 is the original dataset needed to
be protected, where N is the size of the dataset and the input-
label pair (x, y) ∈ X ×Y . We now define some key concepts
for further discussion. The illustration of those concepts is
shown in Fig. 1.
• selected image: For a given original dataset D, the se-
lected image xselected ∈ {x|(x, y) ∈ D}.
• target image: The target image is also from the orig-
inal dataset D and used for the modification of the se-
lected image.
• modified image: The modified image is initialized
with the selected image and updated by minimizing
the distance between output of itself and output of the
target image in the middle layer of a given pre-trained
DNN.
• original label: The label of selected image.
• target label: The label of target image and modified
image.
pre-trained DNN
target image 
(Target Label: 
0690754)
selected image 
(Original Label: 
0647744)
modified image 
(Target Label: 
0690754)
Fig. 1: The illustration of selected image, target image, mod-
ified image, and their corresponding label.
As suggested in [17], the features used by DNNs can be
divided into stable and unstable two categories. Intuitively
speaking, stable features are visible and interpretable to hu-
mans, such as the profile [18, 19], while the unstable features
are usually invisible, such as the texture [15, 16]. Both stable
and unstable features are strongly predictive for the classi-
fier. Since unstable features can be replaced easily without
being discovered by humans (small variance in image), these
features can be utilized to construct a new dataset with dis-
torted mapping, namely the modified dataset. The detailed
construction procedure will be discussed in the following sec-
tions.
2.2. Mapping distortion protection
As discussed above, hiding the ground-truth mapping be-
tween image and its label is critical for privacy protection.
Therefore, instead of storing the original dataset directly,
we suggest keeping the modified version whose input-label
mapping is distorted.
In this paper, we propose a novel method, dubbed map-
ping distortion protection (MDP), for constructing such a
modified dataset. Specifically, in order to extract the useful
yet unstable features from the target image, we utilize a stan-
dard pre-trained DNN. We first initialize the modified image
with the selected image and then minimize the distance be-
tween the output of the modified image and the output of the
target image in the middle layer of the DNN. We construct the
modified training set Dmod via a one-to-one correspondence
xselected → xmodified, where xselected is the selected image
and xmodified is the modified image. To be specific, for
every target image xtarget with label ytarget in D, MDP ran-
domly chooses a selected image xselected with original label
yoriginal from the D and initialize xmodified with xselected.
Then, MDP updates xmodified gradually so that the output
of xmodified and the output of xtarget are similar in the mid-
dle layer of the DNN to guarantee that the features used by
the DNN are relevant. MDP updates xmodified through the
following optimization:
xmodified = argmin
xmodified∈[0,1]d
||f(xmodified)−f(xtarget)||p, (1)
where d is the dimension of the features, and f is the mapping
from input to the output of a certain layer in DNN, such as the
last layer or the penultimate layer. Specifically, we optimize
xmodified in the input space using the projected gradient de-
scent (PGD) [20].
As Fig. 2 shows, the modified image is obtained from the
combination of the selected image and small perturbation re-
lated to unstable yet useful features. Since those invisible yet
useful features in the modified dataset are still highly predic-
tive, the distorted mapping can still lead to good generaliza-
tion in the training of DNNs.
selected image
Stable features; 
Original label: 1722914.
modified image
Stable and unstable features; 
Original Label: 1722914; 
Target Label: 0698346. perturbation
Useful, unstable features; 
Target label: 0698346.
Fig. 2: The illustration of modified image.
Algorithm 1: Construction procedure of the augmented
dataset.
Input: Original dataset D, Augmentation-related
hyper-parameter T .
Output: Augmented dataset DmodAug
Initialize DmodAug = {}
for time in range (T ) do
for (xtarget, ytarget) ∈ D do
Randomly pick a pair (xselected, yoriginal) ∈ D.
Calculate xmodified according to Equation (1).
DmodAug = DmodAug ∪ {(xmodified, ytarget)}.
end
end
return DmodAug
2.3. Augmented mapping distortion protection
As mentioned in the previous section, we can use the modi-
fied dataset instead of the original dataset for storage to pro-
tect data privacy. However, due to the adverse effects of the
incorrect stable features in the modified images, training with
them will result in a certain decrease in the generalization ac-
curacy. In this section, we introduce the augmented MDP
(AugMDP), which enhances model performance effectively.
Specifically, in AugMDP, we first construct T different
modified datasets {D(1)mod, · · · ,D(T )mod} through MDP, where
T is a non-negative hyperparameter to control the augmenta-
tion size. Then, the augmented dataset is obtained by com-
bining all these datasets, i.e., DmodAug = D(1)mod ∪ D(2)mod ∪
· · · ∪ D(T )mod. This augmented method is effective since the
extra information carried by the unstable yet useful features
in the augmented version is conducive to the learning of the
model. The construction procedure of the augmented dataset
is shown in Algorithm 1, and the effectiveness of such aug-
mentation is verified in Section 3.3.
3. EXPERIMENTS
3.1. Settings
The experiments are conducted in CIFAR-10 [21] and (re-
strict) CASIA-WebFace dataset [22]. Note that instead of
the whole CASIA-WebFace, we only focus on a subset of
the dataset for the consideration of computational complex-
ity. Restricted CASIA-WebFace has 46492 images with only
1000 classes, which are randomly chosen from the original
one. For the model architecture, ResNet-50 [23] and IR-50
with ArcFace (an improved version of the vanilla ResNet-50)
[24] are used in CIFAR-10 and restricted CASIA-WebFace
datasets, respectively. To construct the modified dataset, we
perform PGD [20] to optimize the objective function under
`∞ norm, which aims to minimize the distance between the
output of the modified image and output of the target image in
the penultimate layer of the pre-trained model. Specifically,
PGD-100 and PGD-40 with step size 0.1 are used in CIFAR-
10 and restricted CASIA-WebFace dataset, respectively. The
code and dataset will be publicly available.
0
20
40
60
80
100
CIFAR-10 restricted CASIA-WebFace
original dataset accuracy modified dataset accuracy
Fig. 3: Test accuracy in CIFAR-10, restricted CASIA-
WebFace and their corresponding modified dataset.
MDP AugMDP (2)
CIFAR-10 85.52 89.04
restricted CASIA-WebFace 83.04 84.67
Table 1: Test accuracy of MDP and AugMDP in modified
dataset constructed from CIFAR-10 and restricted CASIA-
WebFace dataset.
3.2. Verification on CIFAR-10 and CASIA-WebFace
In this experiment, we construct two datasetsDmod−CIFAR10
and Dmod−CASIA from CIFAR-10 and restricted CASIA-
WebFace, respectively. The left-hand side of Fig.3 represents
the test accuracy of the model trained on CIFAR-10, and of
the model trained on Dmod−CIFAR10. The right-hand side
of Fig.3 indicates the generalization performance of model
trained on restricted CASIA-WebFace and of model trained
on Dmod−CASIA. The result shows DNNs trained on the
Target label: Ship Cat Deer Horse
Target label: 1133714 0000174 2046862 04815471133714 1133714 1133714
Ship Ship Ship
(a) CIFAR-10
Target label: Ship Cat Deer Horse
Target label: 1133714 0000174 2046862 04815471133714 1133714 1133714
Ship Ship Ship
(b) restricted CASIA-WebFace
Fig. 4: The illustration of target images and modified images in CIFAR-10 and restricted CASIA-WebFace. The first column:
target images from original datasets. The next three columns: modified images corresponding to the target images. The red
and blue words indicate the original and target label, respectively.
Network Architecture Dmod−CIFAR10
ResNet-50 85.52
ResNet-154 86.08
DenseNet-154 83.15
Network Architecture Dmod−CASIA
IR-50 83.04
IR-152 84.37
IR-SE-50 81.37
Table 2: The transferability evaluation in Dmod−CIFAR10 and Dmod−CASIA.
modified dataset can generalize well in the standard testset,
and therefore the utility of the dataset is verified.
Fig. 4 illustrates some target images and the modified im-
ages. To quantitively assess the similarity between the se-
lected image and corresponding modified image, we calcu-
late SSIM (Structural Similarity Index) [25] of the pairs. The
mean SSIM for CIFAR-10 and restricted CASIA-WebFace
are 96.9% and 96.1%, respectively. The results show that the
modified image is highly similar to the selected image, there-
fore the invisibility of modification is guaranteed.
3.3. Augmentation effect
To verify the effectiveness of the augmentation in AugMDP,
we compare AugMDP and MDP on both CIFAR-10 and re-
stricted CASIA-WebFace datasets. Table 1 shows the test
accuracy of these two methods on two datasets, where the
number in the parenthesis following AugMDP is the value of
augmentation-related hyper-parameter T . Particularly, Aug-
MDP (1) is equivalent to MDP.
Table 1 shows AugMDP is better than MDP across differ-
ent tasks even when T is relatively small. Besides, T should
be adjusted according to specific requirements, since Aug-
MDP brings additional computations and storage costs.
3.4. Transferability
In this experiment, we verify whether a modified dataset gen-
erated by a given network is also effective for training similar
network architectures.
Table 2 shows the test accuracy of several architectures
(ResNet-50, ResNet-154, and DenseNet-154 [26]) trained in
Dmod−CIFAR10 generated by standard ResNet-50, and the
test accuracy of IR-50, IR-152, and IR-SE-501 trained on the
Dmod−CASIA generated by IR-50 model. The result shows
that the modified dataset is also effective for training similar
network architectures, which indicates that unstable features
in the visual images are probably general to similar classifiers.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose mapping distortion protection
(MDP) and its augmentation-based extension (AugMDP)
to protect the data privacy by modifying dataset. This method
is motivated by the fact that DNNs utilize some useful yet
unstable features, which can be modified invisibly. Based
on this method, we can protect privacy when the dataset is
leaked and achieve good generalization when training on such
a modified dataset. Extensive experiments are conducted to
verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the method.
1IR-SE-50 combines IR-50 and SENet [27].
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